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At the Supreme Court:

A new look at correcting
errors in wills and other
donative transfers

A

lthough Lawrence Waggoner, '63, the
Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, isn't

a legislator or a judge, he teaches mostly
law that he's had a hand in writing. He's

'I newr thought it wo11/d happen so fast'

been giYen the opportunity to haYe a direct

\,\!here first principles really come first

influence on the law through his reportorial
work with the American Law Institute and the
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\lining targets 'total theory'

Uniform Law Conference.
One of the features of his work as reporter
for the Restatement (Third)

ef Property (Wills

and Other Donative Tranifers) and for the

Uniform Probate Code is the way errors
in the execution or the content of wills arc
treated. In an essay prepared by Waggoner and
John H. Langbein, the associate reporter for
the Restatement and a member of the drafting
committee for the Uniform Probate Code,
the authors note that "courts haYe traditionally applied a rule of strict compliance and
held the will in\'alid when some innocuous
blunder occurred in complying with the Wills
Act formalities, such as when one attesting
witness went to the washroom before the
other had finished signing. Likewise, the
courts haYe traditionally applied a no-reformation rule in cases of mistaken terms, for
example, when the typist dropped a paragraph
from the will or the drafter misrendered
names or other attributes of a devise; the
court would not correct the will no matter
how conclusiYely the mistake was shown."
They write, howe\'er, that there is a
"fledgling mo,·ement to excuse harmless
execution errors and to reform mistaken
terms in wills" that has recciYed reinforcement in the Restatement and the Uniform
Probate Code, both of which seek to safeguard
against weak or fraudulent claims by imposing
an exceptionally high standard of proof ( clear
and convincing e\'idence). The Restatement and
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the Uniform Probate Code reYersc the
strict-compliance rule, allowing the court
to uphold a defcctiYely executed will if
the proponent establishes by clear and
con\'incing e\'idence that the decedent
adopted the document as his or her will.
The Restatement reverses the no-reformation rule, authorizing courts to reform
mistaken terms in a will if the mistake is
shown by clear and convincing eYidcncc.
The Restatement's reformation rule is also
incorporated into the new Uniform Trust
Code, and a proposal to incorporate it
into the Unifo~m Probate Code is on the
drawing board.
According to Waggoner and Langbein,
the two cases that best illustrate the new
harmless -error and reformation doctrines
arc Estate ef Hall, 5 1 P. 3d 1 I 34 ( Montana
2002), and Estate ef Herce9, I 93 Misc .2d
201,747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sur. Ct. 2002) .
In Estate ef Hall, spouses Jim and Betty
Hall had \·isitecl their attorney's office
to discuss a new draft will, made and
agreed to scYcral changes, and then left
under the impression that the signed draft
would sene as the \,·ill until the final
Ycrsion was prepared and executed.
At the encl of their meeting, Jim asked
the attorney if the draft (as revised) could
stand as a will until the final Yersion could
be prepared. The attorney, apparently in
ignorance of the statutory requirement of
two attesting witnesses, adYised them that
the draft would be Yalid if Jim and Betty
executed the draft and he notarized it .
Bcttv testified that no one else was in the
office at the time to serve as an attesting
witness. Jim and Betty proceeded to sign
the will and the attorney notarized it
without anyone else present. When they
returned home, Jim told Betty to tear up
his earlier will, which she did.
Jim died before the final version could
be prepared and properly executed. The
J

probate court upheld the draft under
Montana's enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code's harmless-error statute.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Montana affirmed, saying that the uncontraclictcd testimony that Jim's intent for
the joint will "to stand as a will until [the
attorney] prm·ided one in a cleaner, more
final form" was sufficient to support the
trial court's judgment admitting the will
to probate .
In Estate ef Herce9, the residuary clause
of the will of Eugenia Herceg stated: "All
the rest, residue and remainder of the
property which I may own at the time of
my death, real and personal, and wheresoever the same may be situate."
The drafting attorney filed an affidaYit
stating that the current will was a redraft
of a previous will, and in redrafting that
pre\·ious will using computer software,
"some lines from the residuary clause
were accidentally deleted ." The pre\·ious
will, which was admitted into e\·idence,
identified the residuary legatee as the
testator's nephew or, if he failed to
sunive, the nephew's wife.
The court noted that the traditional
rule that the court cannot supply missing
names to correct a mistake conflicts with
the primary objective of ascertaining
the intention of the testator. Quoting
liberally from the Restatement, the court
concluded that "it seems logical to this
court to choose the path of considering
all available cYidcncc as recommended
bvJ the Restatement in order to achieve
the dominant purpose of carrying out
the intention of the testator.... [W]hat
makes sense is to construe the will to add
the missing proYision by inserting the
names of the residuary beneficiaries from
the prior will."
Waggoner and Langbein point out that
both Hall and Herce9 inrnlvcd attorney

error. They argue that the new remedies
for mistake (the harmless -error rule,
reformation) arc to be preferred o\·er
exposure to malpractice liability because
of"thc simple truth that preventing loss is
better than compensating loss."
Although questions of execution
errors and mistaken terms arc traditionally the proYince of state law and state
courts, the authors note that the new
intcnt-scning rules ha\·e a role to play
under federal law. The unusually broad
preemption proYision of the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) preempts relcnnt state law
even when ERISA is completely silent on
the question. "The scholarly literature,"
they report, "suggests that the federal
courts should look to the Restatement as a
source of federal common law" in adjudicating mistaken beneficiary designations
in ERISA-co\'ered plans.
[A copy of the Waggoner-Langbein
essay can be obtained by sending an
e-mail request to Professor Waggoner:
waggoncr umich.cdu.]
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American Society of Comparative Law
honors Eric Stein, '42

T

he American Society of ComparatiYc
Law (ASCL) has honored Eric Stein,
'42, the Law School's Hessel E.Yntema
Professor of Law Emeritus and a pioneer
in the study of European law, with a
Lifetime Achie,·ement A,Yard.
ASCL President Da,·id Clark noted
that "we arc celebrating some of the
legends of comparative law." Stein,
however, modestly claimed in his acceptance remarks that he merely "backed
into" comparative law, indeed that he
doesn't e,·en fit the mold of a comparati\'ist .
Stein need not tr\' to fit molds. He's
been creating them for more than half a
century: He was a leader among scholars
who first recognized the potential for
J
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eYcntual European union of the nascent
European Coal and Steel Community, and
his books, journal articles, and lectures
have can·ed a niche in the academic field
of comparatiYc law.
Stein is "the founding father of
European Community law," Matthias
Reimann, LL.M. '83, said in his
announcement of Stein as one of the
society's three lifetime achieYcmcnt
award recipients. "Eric has maintained
the highest standards, and his work sho\\·s
great craftsmanship, care, and depth,"
said Reimann, the Law School's Hessel E.
Yntema Professor of Law.
Stein and Reimann share more than
the title of their named professorships.
Reimann said he often has sought Stein's

ach·ice on scholarly questions and found
him to be a fair and rigorous critic and a
good friend.
"I suggested that I do not fit the traditional image of a comparati\'e lawyer,"
Stein noted io his acceptance remarks.
"Nor can I claim membership in the
exclusi\'e group of European refugee
scholars who came to this country with
an established reputation and helped to
create the comparative law discipline
here. In fact, I backed into the comparative law field from a base in international
law and international organization.
"First, I started teaching international
law from my colleague Bill Bishop's
!long-time U-M Law School faculty
member and international law scholar

Professor/- 111eril11\ I ric Stei11, '-+2. le/i
111/ll at right, delii·ers re111arhs a_fier
receiri11g Iii, a11,rrcl.

William W Bishop Jr.] innovative
casebook that paid attention to international law in national courts: That proved
an immensely fertile area for a comparison of the different idiosyncratic styles in
which different states gi,·e effect to their
international obligations in their distinct
national legal orders."
More than 30 years later, Stein
still was comparing: "In the early '90s,
I was a member of an international

Last year, Stein was included in the
exclusive International Biographic
Center's Lil'ing Legends book and was
nominated as an International Educator of
the Year. Last summer, he was the subject
of a major article in Jungle Law magazine,
which celebrated him at 91 as "the oldest
active law professor in the country" and
noted that "the number of his former
students who are already retired could
staff a large law firm." This year he is to

expert group adYising the Czechs
and Slovaks on drafting a new federal
constitution - a highly contested and
ultimately aborted enterprise. I was
responsible for the articles dealing
with foreign affairs
including again
the issue of the effects of international

be recognized at the biennial meeting of
the European Union Studies Association
for his extraordinary contribution to

law on internal law and the opening of
the constitution to the outside ,vorld .
Herc again comparisons with Western
federal constitutions were at the core of
a fascinating debate . I tried to recapture
the storv in a book on the Czech-SloYak
split." (Czech o/ Slornkia: Ethnic Coriflict,
Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup,
was published in English in 1997 and
reprinted in Czech in 2000.)
The ASCL's presentation of a Lifetime
Achievement Award was the most
recent of sc,·eral similar awards giYcn
to Stein o,·cr the past few years. In
2001, in ceremonies in Prague, Czech
Republic President Vaclav Havel personally presented the Czech-born Stein with
the Medal of Merit First Degree for his
"outstanding scientific achievement ."
The trip to Prague also proYided Stein
and his wife, Virginia, the opportunity to
travel to his birth city of Holice, which
made him an honorary citizen . Stein
fled Czechoslovakia in 1940 in the face
of the Nazi adYance. Most of his family
members, he learned later, died in the
Holocaust.
J

European Union studies.
The ASCL presentation was part of
the society's annual meeting at the Law
School last fall. Focusing on "Comparative
Law and Human Rights," the meeting
timed its opening to include presenta tion of the William W Bishop Jr. Lecture
in International Law by Mary Robinson,
former president of Ireland and former
UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights. (Sec story on page 14.) The
meeting also included two days of discussions on comparative law and human
rights.
The discussion panel participants
included scholars, activists, and others,
and the panels were designed to
encourage interchange on "comparati,·e law and human rights rather than
comparati\'e human rights," Reimann
explained in his remarks opening the
meeting. Reimann is an editor in chief of
ASCL's American Journal ef Comparatil•e Law
and acted as host for the meeting.
"This is sort of a conference without
papers" designed to encourage conversation and exploration of"the relationship
and learning opportunities between
these two disciplines," Reimann said.
Afterward, participants agreed that the
combination of shortened formal presen-

tations and extended opportunities for
discussion and comparison had produced
especially li,·ely and thought-prornking
sessions.
Panel discussions were divided into
three categories:
I _A plenary session on "Western
Human Rights: Tensions within the
Club," which included discussions of
'The European System: Gay Rights" and
'The Transatlantic Dimension: The Death
Penalty."
2 . "Western Human Rights and
Non -Western Resistance," made up
of roundtablc discussions on "Islamic
Law: Women's Rights," "Asian
Systems: Counterpoint to Human
Rights?", "African Traditions: Female
Circumcisions," and "Third World Claims:
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights."
3. Roundtables on "Human Rights in
Domestic Legal Orders," with sessions
on "South Africa: Constitution Building"
and "Israel : Constitutional Ernlution
and the Boundaries of Comparative
Jurisprudence."
There also was a session on scholarly
works in process and a concluding
discussion .
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At the Supreme Court:

'I never thought it would happen so fast'
Prcjessor Richard D. Friedman and
graduate j~fji-ey L. Fisher, '97, collaborated
on Cra,Yford \'. Washington, ll'hich Fisher
.rnccessfully 01;qued before the U.S. Supreme
Court. For Friedman, the cme affirmed a
position he had been adrncatingfor some
time. For Fisher, ,dw also argued a ~econd case
before the court the mme term, the e.,periences
re-q_Jfirmed "hat he had learned at the Court
as a clerk.

I

f you're a professor like Richard D.
Friedman - he is the Law School's
Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law - you
wage your campaign to change the law
using the tools of academic articles,
book chapters, and, when you have the
opportunity, court briefs. And you hope
someone notices.
Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court
noticed, ruling in Craeford I'. Washington
that "where testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reli abilitv, sufficient to satisfv, constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation."
"I neYer thought it would happen
so fast," Friedman excitedly says of the
restoration of the Confrontation Clause
to its original, simple elegance. A scholar
like himself often can devote an entire
career to championing a change in the
law, he explains. For him, it happened in
about a decade.
The Cra11ford decision reestablishes
what the U.S. Constitution, and generations of English law before it, demands,
according to Friedman. U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia cited
Friedman in the Court's majority opinion
as among the "members of this Court
and academics [who] have suggested that
34
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we reYise our doctrine to reflect more
accurately the original understanding of
the [Confrontation) Clause."
Cranfo rd reversed more than a quarter
century of jurisprudence that had diluted
the Confrontation Clause to allow
the admission of hearsay, or un-cross
examined evidence if it has an adequate
"indicia of reliability" (Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, (19801). In other words, any
out of court statement, no matter how
accusatory, that a court determined to be
reliable could be used against a defendant
without the defendant being able to cross
examine and confront the source of the
evidence.
Friedman dipped into the hearsay
maelstrom as far back as the 1980s,
when he decided to write the sections on
hearsay for the project he was editing, The
i\'ewWigmore:A Treatise on Eridence. By the
1990s his misgivings about hearsay were
translating into advocating for restoration
of the confrontation right.
That e\'olution accelerated when he
was studying at Oxford in the mid-1990s.
As he pored over the ancient volumes
in the law library there, his research reaffirmed how deeply the right to confront
a witness is embedded in the English
system of law that the United States
inherited.
"I found myself being sucked into
the historical origins of the right, and I
realized that a fundamental value of our
criminal justice system had become badly
obscured," he explained. "Confrontation
is a procedural right, not just a matter
of what evidence gets admitted and how
to look at it, but more importantly the
procedures by which a witness gives
testimony.

At the Supreme Court:

Where first principles really come first
"In the old Continental courts,
witnesses gave their testimony behind
closed doors, out of the presence of
the parties. But in the common law
system, a prosecution witness gives
testimony openly in the face of the
defendant. The English fought hard
to establish this right, and it was a
critical part of the system of criminal
procedure that tra\·eled to America."
Before goin'g to England he had
been writing articles with titles
like "Improving the Procedure for
Resolving Hearsay Issues" (Cardow
Law Re1'iew, 1991) and "Toward a
Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic
Analysis of Hearsay" (Minnesota Lall'
Re1'iell', 1992).
After his research in England,
he began producing articles like
"Thoughts from Across the Water on
Hearsay and Confrontation" (Criminal
Law Rel'iew, 1998) and "Confrontation:
The Search for Basic Principles"
(Geor9etoll'n Lawjournal, 1998). Scalia
cited the latter article in his Crmijord
opinion.
Friedman's campaign on behalf of
confrontation got a boost in 1998,
when Margaret A. Berger, a wellknown evidence scholar, im-ited him
to join on an American Ci\·il Liberties
Union brief in Lilly v. Vir9inia, in which
a defendant challenged admissibility
of a statement from an accomplice .
In ruling that Lilly's confrontation
right had been violated, the Supreme
Court did not alter the prevailing
framework, but Justice Breyer wrote
a concurring opinion that expressed
sympathy for the ACLU brief and
prompted Friedman to contribute
co11ti1111ed 011 page
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J~lji·cy L. Fi,hcr. '97, rcccncly named Runner
up La11ycr of the >car b) the National La\\·

Journal, clerked ar the U.S. Supreme Court
11·irh justice John Paul ~te1 cm in / 99S-99
and no11· is an al/orm:; 11 ilh Daris ll'right
Ti-emainc UP in Scaule. During the Court's
1003-0../- term, F-i,hcr ,ucce,_,fiiI0· G/gued
11rn cases before the Courr, Cra\\·forcl \'.
\Vashington. 11hich concerned the d~jcndam 's righ1 to canfron1 1ho,e 11 ho 1cs1 !fr
again.,1 him, and Blake!~ 1. \Vashington.
11hich deoli 11i1h 1he role ,?}'judge and j111y
in ,rn1cncing. I /ere, Fi,hcr reflects on his path
Ji'om la11· school ro his clerkship at the Court,
and then hack ro rhe Court as a pracricing
la11yer.

By Jeffrey L. Fisher
One of the great luxuries of law
school is the abilitvI to debate evervI
question. No legal premise or court
decision is sacrosanct. b ·ery case in
the casebooks has
forceful contentions
on both sides and
could be decided
either wav. Even·
decision is held up to
scrutiny as if it could
be overruled bvI
the end of class if a
student makes a good enough argument.
When we enter practice, however, we
discover that it doesn't exactly work that
way. Litigators spend most of their time
either operating under binding precedent
or at least arguing that a court must
reach a certain result because a higher
court decision dictates that outcome.
We operate in an edifice that, if not fully
decorated, is at least framed out and
plastered.
I

I

But during the year I had the privilege
to clerk for Justice Stevens, I learned
what might seem an obvious lesson:
The Supreme Court is the highest court
there is, so precedent rarely dictates any
outcome there. It does not reallvI matter
how many lower courts ha\·e operated
under a certain assumption or reached a
certain conclusion. If the Supreme Court
has not considered the issue, it is an
open issue, and the justices will decide it
according to their own tools of constitutional or statutory interpretation.
But even then - and here's where
this lesson was not so obvious, at least
to me - the Supreme Court's own
prior decisions hardly ever foreordain
the outcome of a case . Sitting on the
sidelines, as clerks do, and listening over
the course of a term to Supreme Court
justices at oral arguments, one quickly
realizes that they rarely feel hemmed in
by suggestions or trends in the Court's
prior decisions. Even when the Supreme
Court has squarely decided an issue,
justices who dissented still may be
unwilling to accept that result in the next
case .
Consequently, advocates in the Court
are far better off trying to persuade the
justices with first principles than with an
argument that they have incrementally
more precedent on their side. I observed
that the most successful advocates offered
compelling visions of the basic schematics
of the law, instead of - or at least in
addition to - arguments that lower
courts of appeals misapplied the holding
of a prior case.

conti1111ecl 011 page
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co11ti1111ed fro111 Fried11w11 011 page 35
"Lilly ,,. Vir9inia: Glimmers of Hope for

the Confrontation Clause?" to the online
journal International Commentary on
Ei·idence.

Friedman continued to confront the
issue of confrontation, writing articles
like "The Conundrum of Children,
Confrontation, and Hearsay'"'(Law and
Contemporary Problems, 2002), "Dial-In
Testimony" (with Associate Dean for
Clinical Affairs Bridget McCormack,

Frier honored by Classics
Department
oman law specialist Bruce Frier, the
Henry King Ransom Professor of
Law, now holds a second named professorship, in the University's Department
of Classical Studies, part of the College
of Literature, Science, and the Arts.
Frier, one of several Law School faculty members who hold joint academic
appointments within the University, has
been named the Frank 0. Copley Collegiate Professor of Classics and Roman
Law.
The appointment allowed Frier
to name his professorship, and Frier
chose Copley, a professor of Latin who
taught at the U-M from 1934 until 1977.
Copley died in 1993.The Copley Prize
is awarded annually in recognition of
outstanding achievement in Latin.

R
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Unirersit)'

ef Pennsyfrania Law Reriew,

2002), "Remote Testimony (Michi9an
Journal ef Law Reform, 2002), and the
chapter "No Link: The Jury and the
Origins of Confrontation Right and the
Hearsay Rule," in The Dearest Birth Ri9ht
the People

ef
ef En9land: The Jury in the History

ef the Common Law (2002).
In 2003, Seattle-based attorney Jeffrey
Fisher, '97, who had become familiar
with Friedman's work on confrontation, sent Friedman his petition seeking
Supreme Court re,,iew of CraHford v.
Washin9ton. The case involved admission
of a statement a defendant's wife made to
police without giving the defendant the
opportunity to cross-examine . When the
Court decided to take the case, Friedman
authored an amicus brief, and he arranged
for Fisher, an attorney with Davis Wright
Tremaine, to moot the case at the Law
School the week before he argued it in
November 2003. At Fisher's request,
Friedman sat as second chair at the
argument.
"Jeff made the brave decision to
put the emphasis on the broad issue of
whether the prevailing doctrine of the
confrontation right should be replaced,"
rather than narrowly focusing on whether
that doctrine precluded the use of the
challenged statement, according to
Friedman.

The Court's decision came in March
2004: "Where testimonial evidence is at
issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands
what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination .... Where testi monial statements arc at issue, the only
idicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes : confrontation ."
But the Court threw out a caveat, too:
"We lea,·e for another day any effort to
spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial.' Whatever else the term
co,·crs, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations. These arc
the modern practices with closest kinship
to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed."
So Friedman isn't finished yet with
confrontation. Defining "testimonial"
demands considerable legal exploration, he says, and he 's jumping into that
exploration with the same tools he used
earlier. He's already written "Adjusting to
Cranford : High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection"
(Criminolo8)' }ournal, 2004), "The Cranford
Transformation" (Section on E,,idence
Newsletter, 2004) and "The Confrontation
Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed"
(Cato Supreme Court Review, 2004).
(An edited excerpt from the latter
article begins on page 80.) And he
has started The Confrontation Blog,
www.confrontationright.blogspot.com .
There will be, he promises, more to
come .

Vining targets 'total theory'
L

egal philosopher Joseph Vining, the
HarrvJ Burns Hutchins Professor
of Law, argues in his newest book, The
Sons Sparroll' and the Child (University
of Notre Dame Press, 2004), that law
and science should join hands in mutual
respect. Otherwise, he fears, sciencebased "total theory" may eclipse the glow
of human concern
for the individual
and obscure the
unifying links of the
chain of life .
The physical
book itself reinforces Vining's
holistic approach
to his subject. It is printed entirely on
post-consumer recycled paper processed
without chlorine, part of the effort of the
Green Press Initiative, a consortium of
more than 30 U.S. publishers that have
agreed to maximize their use of postconsumer recycled paper and to phase
out their use of paper with ancient forest
fiber content.
As his subtitle "Claims of Science
and Humanity" hints, Vining decries
the overextension of scientific understanding into "total theory," and notes
that human experimentation in the
German and Manchurian death camps of
the 20th century showed how easily the
line that protects people can be crossed.
Throughout the book, he writes, "we
will be asking how any total vision of
the \\·orld can claim the true allegiance
of human beings living and thinking
together in it."
"This book is also about belief
or
not - in spirit," he continues . "The child
learns to speak. The song sparrow comes
to sing a beautiful song, special not just
to its kind but to its indi\'idual throat and

tongue. They arc often compared, the
development of indiYidual song in the
song sparrow and language in the child.
Experiments that could be gruesome and
called atrocitvJ in a human context arc
performed on the young song sparrow.
What is it that holds us back from
performing the same experiment on the
child - or letting it be done?"
Spirit and the legal sensibility we all
share is the answer, though that is too
simple a way to put it, as Vining makes
clear in his discussion of the interplay of
scientific system and individual uniqueness. The law is the place where the
"system" and the "individual" meet, he
writes, \\·here "scientists and those who
do not devote their li,·es to science must
meet . .. to trace the line of action and
suffering and decide where the sparro\\· is
to be put, and the child ."
Harold Shapiro, former president of
the University of Michigan and Princeton
UniYersity, and chairman of President
Clinton's National Bioethics Ad,·isorvJ
Commission, called The Sons Sparrow and
the Child "an erudite and poetic discourse
on the dangers of those attitudes that
assign all power, possibilities, and
responsibilities to humankind or conceh·e
of humankind as the ultimate creator."
George Levine of Rutgers University
said the book "is an amazingly learned,
unpretentiously cultured meditation on a
moral, spiritual, and cultural problem."
Vining's prcYious books include
Lesa! Identity, The Authoritatii-e and the
Authoritarian, and From , ewton 's Sleep.
He holds a B.A. in zoology from Yale
University, an M .A. in history from
Cambridge Uni versity, and a J.D. from
Hanard Uni\'ersitv.
J

l'llllli1111etl ji-11111 Fisher

Oil

puge 3)

Although this unique aspect of
Supreme Court procedure might
appear to edge toward chaos , I came
to believe it is a great institutional
strength. Our culture is constantly
evoh-ing, and if the law is to remain
stable and adaptable, there must be
at least one group of decision makers
with the willingness and ability
persistently to re-eYaluate even the
most accepted legal principles .
Ha\"ing embraced this reality as
a clerk, it became quite liberating
and exciting as a practicing attorney.
Last year, it helped me persuade the
justices to adopt a new approach to
the Confrontation Clause, abandoning a framework the Court had
employed - and many justices in
the majority in my case had followed
- for m·cr two decades. It also
helped me convince the justices to
examine erosion of the right to trial
by jury under modern sentencing
guidelines systems, even though the
broad consensus in the lower courts
was that no such problem existed .
In short, the Supreme Court frees
lawyers to argue the way we did in
law school
for the right result, not
just the one that precedent allows. It
allows us to consider eYery problem
afresh . I am grateful for the opportunity to understand and to employ that
lesson.
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